The needs of governmental agencies that have jurisdictional responsibility for formulating and executing environmental policy at different levels are by and large similar in all countries of the CIS. However, the balance of power between different levels and branches of government can vary. One must differentiate clearly between the needs of environmental authorities as they represent the public interest, and the institutional needs of governmental bodies as they represent the political and administrative interests of the institutions themselves.
In summarizing the needs, this analytical report discusses several types of needs. First, it details a country's priority needs. Second, it reviews the needs a NREC could address effectively. For example, while a country may have a critical need to undertake a costly environmental remediation project or build a waste water treatment facility, a NREC would not undertake such expensive projects. This report pays particular attention to government needs entailing public participation and government-NGO relations. Finally, the needs that the countries have in common are discussed. These shared needs prove important for this report since the probability exists that other countries in the CIS face similar needs. The reader should bear this in mind when reading the country discussions.
Pursuant the TOR, the primary sources of research were:
Since the field work for CGNA was performed in national capitals, the data collection for reporting on LANA is based on comprehensive surveys of a number of selected regions in the three republics.
In Ukraine, the LANA substudy was conducted in three large regions that cover most of the country: Kyiv, Donbass (Donetsk, Arteoumovsk, Lugansk), the western Ukraine (Lvov, Ternopol, Chernovtzi) and southern Ukraine (Odessa). Sixteen officials from the executive and legislative branches of local government were interviewed.
In Russia, the substudy targeted the Karelian Republic, Nizhni Novgorod and Vladimir oblasts. These regions have diverse economic, political and environmental situations and can help provide a picture of the overall situation for Regional and Local Authorities in Russia. Conducting field studies in all the regions of Russia was impossible. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with fifteen representatives from the executive and legislative branches of government - primarily the executive branch and primarily at the regional level. The substudy also considered the pertinent laws, reports, articles and other secondary source materials.
In Moldova, eight interviews for the LANA substudy report were conducted in three of the ten administrative environmental zones with directors of the zone agencies and other government officials. The zones selected were Cahul, Orhei and Balti.
The substudy reports indicated a wide range of needs in the various countries. In some instances, the substudy reports identified needs that the Central Government Authorities did not articulate, but the expert who prepared the report identified as important. In this chapter, the terms "central government," "state" or "authorities" refer to the national governments and terms "regional" and "local authorities" refer to the "oblast" (province) and "rayon" (district, town, city) level governments, respectively.
First, the central governmental bodies are represented by a National or Presidential Security Council's environmental commission, or its equivalent. Second, environmental departments or commissions within the national government supervise the state policy with regard to environmental safety, proper use of natural resources and other related issues. Third, environmental ministries or state departments are responsible for carrying out state environmental policy. Besides "purely" environmental ministries, a number of other ministries or other executive branch institutes (such as State Committees, State Departments, or State Agencies) are engaged in various activities with regard to the status of the environment: agriculture, forestry health care, geology, hydrometeorology, etc., ministries or state departments and agencies. In addition, a number of controlling bodies ("state inspectorates") are subordinated to these ministries. Finally, environmental commissions, subcommissions or committees of parliament deal with environmental legislation.
The regional environmental authorities consist of regional institutions that directly represent the central executive authority (president, governmental agencies and ministries) and specialized institutions established by regional governments (its executive and legislative branches). In Moldova, however, ten zone agencies of the State Department of Environment do not have immediate counterparts representing legislative authority. Also, in Russia, different regional administrative units (oblast's, krai's, republics) have different administrative and political status - some of them have the status of Subjects of Federation with a high degree of autonomy, while others do not. A further status variance comes from the fact that the region's Head of Administration could be an appointee of the President or elected by the regional legislative assembly. In Russia and Ukraine, a characteristic feature of regional authorities at regional level is their double subordination to central government and regional administration. Both of these large republics have a practice of having "interregional" agencies deal with the environment. For instance, the Upper Volga Agency for Hydrometeorology and Environmental monitoring or Volga-Vjatka Inspectorate for Radiological Safety and Supervision represent the Russian interregional ("territorial") bodies that are subordinated directly to the government of the Russian Federation.
The local level environmental administration is represented by local subdivisions of the respective national and regional administrative structures as well as by special public commissions that are subordinated to the local administration and reflect particular interests and concerns of local, self-governing communities. As a rule, the local authorities execute their power with regard to proper use of land and other natural resources. Due to their status, these local commissions tend to be more sensitive to the opinion of local voters and do not report to anybody but the local community represented by its administration. The upper-level executive bodies also maintain their presence at the local level. The latter are represented by local commissions, inspectorates or observation stations. A typical and universal example of this kind of local authority is district or city centers/stations for sanitary and epidemic control that are subordinated to respective regional centers and, further, to either the national health care ministry or state committee for sanitary and epidemic control.
Some particular details as to the countries are provided below.
Local authorities face several problems in protecting the environment, because the Environmental law is not observed and funds for environmental protection have been reduced. The needs of local authorities thus reflect their capacity to enforce the law. Moreover, the law is in a state of flux and is being revised to reflect the changing social, political and economic situations.
The district executive committees and the rural and urban mayoralties are the regional and local authorities which have authority pursuant to the Law on Environment for environmental protection. Nevertheless, the Department of Environmental Protection, a national organization, with its ten zone agencies, provides the primary environmental protection in the districts. The zone agencies are organized on the basis of natural ecological systems and report to both the Department of Environmental Protection and local authorities. Each zone agency has three to five local administrative centers. These local administrative centers oversee forty-five ecological service units in the municipalities and rayons. The reform of state environmental structures as described above was done in anticipation of territorial-administrative reform - which has yet to occur.
Thus, the system of environmental governance in the three republics is far from being a transparent one. A further complication is that the entire system of jurisdictional authority in these countries is still being reshaped and is still not completely formed. Many regions in Russia, for instance, are struggling to achieve the status of federal entities which would bring them greater independence. The central governments in all countries, however, try to maintain their control over many strategic issues at the regional and even local levels. Since the balance of power is in constant flux nowadays, the whole scope of common public interests and concerns about a cleaner and healthy environment can hardly be attributed to any single or even a number of public agencies.
The general needs of environmental authorities are common; but the particular political interests of government institutions are different. Therefore, choosing the right partner for cooperation in regard to a particular service could prove a challenge.
NGOs tend to cooperate more with the legislative than with the executive branch, and work well with regional and local authorities. A direct correlation exists between an NGO's financial status and its attitude toward cooperation with authorities. It appears that those NGOs with an annual budget of at least $5,000 are ready and able to cooperate with the authorities. This tendency is especially clear with regard to relationships with central governments and less certain with regard to cooperation with regional and local authorities.
The figure below illustrates the average NGO's attitudes toward their relationships with central and local governing bodies.
It is worth noting that if an NGO cooperates in any way with a governmental institution, this cooperation is, as a rule, very much dependent on personal ties between an official and an NGO leader.
The Ministry for Environmental Protection and Natural Resources (MEPNR) lacks the clout that the economic ministries and departments have. While the NGOs' relationship with MEPNR may not always be good, the NGOs see the economic ministries as their principal antagonists. The NGOs have a better relationship with the State Duma (Parliament) and its Committee for Ecology. However, as in the executive branch, parliament's economic committees have more power than the environmental committees. Moreover, the Duma is now preoccupied with the upcoming elections.
MEPNR has discussed the issue of establishing a cooperation mechanism with the NGO community. The State program "Ecological Safety of Russia" includes a proposed cooperation project, which will be discussed with the leading figures of the NGO community this fall. Before cooperating with NGOs, the government sets out the following principal conditions:
The various ministries, including MEPNR, have departments to handle public relations. These departments usually have a small staff and lack influence within their respective ministries. Moreover, the personnel lack the experience and expertise to work with NGOs.
The various governmental authorities lack a special office for dealing with NGOs, but usually a particular staff person serves as the government liaison with NGOs. In this regard, personal contacts prove crucial. Some regions have better relations with NGOs than others. For instance, the government of the Nizhni Novgorod oblast enjoys generally broad cooperation with citizens' organizations. This reflects the inclusive policies of Governor Boris Nemtsov and the presence of relatively young administrators - many of whom used to work on public and political citizen initiatives before joining the administration. Generally, the NGOs appear to have better working relations with the regional and local authorities than with the central government representatives. The NGOs also find that the executive branch proves a more effective partner than the legislative branch of government.
At the end of the 1980s, special public councils were formed to advise the environmental committees. While some councils continue to function, a number of officials note that the influence of environmental NGOs appears to be ebbing from its high point in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The public council in Nizhni Novgorod appears to retain its influence. The authorities list, in order of priority, the following areas where cooperation with NGOs proves most beneficial:
In light of the tight budget circumstances, government funds for NGOs are very limited. Support is usually in the form of exchanging information and technical assistance. Authorities may support conferences, seminars and similar events, but rarely provide equipment or facilities for NGOs.
Some government officials believe a NREC could serve as "a bridge between government, NGOs and other institutions involved in environmental protection activities." Both MEPNS and the Cabinet of Ministers indicate an interest in closing the gap. One official proposed that a NREC could assume the MEPNS responsibilities for dealing with NGOs and the public.
There is poor cooperation between local authorities and environmental NGOs. Over half of the local authorities do not have an office to liaison with the public. Representatives of executive authority in the provinces are more active in supporting environmental NGOs than the representatives of local councils.
Regional and local authorities view NGOs as having positive and negative features. They criticize some NGOs as ineffective, underdeveloped, not sufficiently active and extremist. On the other hand, the authorities recognize that NGOs have been instrumental in developing an environmental consciousness and directing the public's attention to environmental problems.
The authorities also recognize the concrete activities in which NGOs have achieved positive results. For example, NGOs participated directly in creating structures in Donetsk which involve the public in the town's environmental services. In Arteuomovsk NGOs prepared recommendations for experts to address priority environmental tasks. Local environmental organizations in Odessa carried out independent environmental examinations with the participation of a skilled specialist. In particular, NGOs were very active in the Odessa terminal project. The Energy Resources organization in Chernovtzi developed innovative energy saving projects and worked out industrial waste standards which work in CIS countries. In Lvov, environmental organizations pursue penalties and fines against polluting industries.
The government envisions a NREC as a possible NGO coordination unit. The government would like to involve NGOs in a variety of projects - in particular, deforestation projects. In many areas of the country people use forest resources for heating and pasture and economic interests take precedence over environmental interests. The government is ready to collaborate with public organizations by providing them with trees and some machines for tree planting. Also, they hope that NGOs could help raise environmental consciousness among the public.
While some environmental authorities may have favorable views of NGOs, for the most part, governmental authorities are indifferent to the public sector and are not aware of their activities. However, the authorities are not necessarily hostile toward NGOs. Government agencies, in most cases, do not have an office to deal with the public.
