Overview

1. Comparative analysis of economic instruments for environmental protection used in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia

1.1 Scope of the analysis

  This analysis covers the instruments that have been reported by the experts (cf. Annex 3). Only such economic instruments are described here which are explicitly in the domain of environmental policy. Instruments that were primarily introduced for non environmental purposes, but which have environmental side-effects are not included; however, a general assessment of such instruments is covered in the country chapters. The reporting format, as well as the classification of economic instruments (cf. Annex 1+2), largely follows the OECD report in order to make comparison easy. For some instrument categories (for instance soil protection charges, charges on hazardous waste, charges on fossil fuels etc.) covered in the OECD report, no examples were reported in the seven assessed countries and thus not included in this analysis. The information presented is valid as of September 1994.

  The analysis is structured in the following way:

1.2 Charges on emissions
Charges on air pollution
Charges on waste
Charges on emissions to surface water
1.3 Product charges
1.4 Emission trading
1.5 Deposit refunds
1.6 Enforcement incentives
1.7 Summary

  If not indicated otherwise, the exchange rates presented on page 6 of this report were used in this analysis. For charge rates, the actual exchange rates (as of September 1994) were used. For total yearly revenues from a specific instrument, the yearly average exchange rates were applied.

1.2 Charges on emissions

1.2.1. Charges on air pollution

  Table 1 presents an overview of the charges on air pollution in place in the seven countries assessed.

Table 1. Charges on air pollution
Country Charge base and rate Revenue Revenue spending
Czech Republic "A" ca. 80 pollutants are specified, the final rates for the main pollutants are:
  • particulates 87.2 ECU/t
  • SO2 29.1 ECU/t
  • NOx 23.3 ECU/t
  • CO 17.4 ECU/t
  • hydrocarbons 58.1 ECU/t
Charge is levied based on self monitoring with random control by the Inspectorates
1992: 21.3 mln ECU
1993: 23.3 mln ECU
Financing programs related to air pollution through the State Environmental Fund
Czech Republic "B" Type of solid fossil fuel used in heating systems with a performance of < 0.2 MW.
The yearly fixed charge is up to 290 ECU / source.
Not known (the implementation of this charge is optional for each municipality) Environmental expen-ditures of the munici-pality where the charge was levied.
Slovak Republic "A" ca. 80 pollutants are specified, the final rates for the main pollutants are:
  • dust 77.8 ECU/t
  • SO2 25.9ECU/t
  • CO 20.8 ECU/t
Charge is levied based on self monitoring with random control by the Inspectorates
1992: 2.5 mln ECU
1993: 6.3 mln ECU
Note: This charge is in force since 6.5.1992.
Financing programs related to air pollution through the State Environmental Fund
Slovak Republic "B" Type of solid fossil fuel used in heating systems with a performance of < 0.2 MW.
The yearly fixed charge is up to 260 ECU / source.
Not known (the implementation of this charge is optional for each municipality) Environmental expen-ditures of the munici-pality where the charge was levied.
Poland: SO2 Direct SO2 emissions: 64.6 ECU/t (1992)
52.9 ECU/t (1993)
1992: 89.2 mln ECU
1993: 149.0 mln ECU
(1993=estimation)
36% to NEP+WMF
54% to VEP+WMF
10% to LEP+WMF
NOx Direct NOx emissions: 64.6 ECU/t (1992)
52.9 ECU/t (1993)
1992: 26.6 mln ECU
1993: 28.6 mln ECU
(1993=estimation)
90% to NEP+WMF
10% to LEP+WMF
Other air pollutants More than 50 other air pollutants are subject to charges and non-compliance fees. Charge rates vary from 0.04 ECU/ton for CO2 to 35165 ECU/ton for some volatile compounds. Because of the lack of pollutant-specific statistical reporting, the exact revenues collected from these charges are difficult to estimate. All together, they contribute to approximately 1/4 of the total revenue collected in the environmental funds.

  The Czech and Slovak air pollution charges "A" are levied on large and medium sized industrial point sources, while the "B" charges can be levied on small point sources (heating systems) of companies (not households). The "A" charges will gradually increase: for 1994 and 1995, 60% of the final rate is applied. In 1997 (Czech Republic) and 1998 (Slovak Republic) the final rates will apply.

  The intention of the Czech "A" charges is to provide economic incentives for pollution reduction measures and to generate revenue. The charges in 1992 - 1993 were quite low (30% of the final rate); the polluters paid as required quite abidingly. There are plans to reduce the list of pollutants and to further decentralize certain charges.

  The intention of the Slovak "A" charges is identical. It was reported, however, that at present 2/3 of the companies being subject to the charge are insolvent. In addition to both the Czech and Slovak "A" charge, there is a non compliance fee for air pollution (cf. 1.6), which can be levied if prescribed emission limits are exceeded.

  The Polish SO2 and NOx charges are levied on companies. There is a corresponding system of permits. Proposed regulation includes the provision to increase the charges proportionally to the estimated inflation rate for the following year. The main purpose of the Polish SO2 and NOx charges in practice is revenue raising. Target groups and political actors often complain that the charges are too high, while investments in pollution abatement technology seem to be rare. In addition to both charges, non compliance fees can be levied (see 1.6), which are 10 times higher than the regular charges, if the emissions exceed the respective standards. In 1991 - 1993, 50 - 80% of imposed non compliance fees were not paid.

  In Hungary it is planned to introduce an air emission charge together with the adoption of new air legislation which is in preparation at present.

1.2.2 Charges on waste

  Two types of waste charges are distinguished as follows: Municipal waste user charges (payment for the service of waste collection and disposal), and waste disposal charges.

Municipal waste user charges

Table 2. Municipal waste user charges
Country Charge base and rate Revenue Revenue spending
Bulgaria Households: as a % of value of the dwelling
Firms: as a % of value of company or building
10.9 mln ECU
(Jan-July 1994)
goes to overall budget of resp. municipality
Czech Republic Households: Actual measurement
Firms: Actual measurement
not known goes to waste treatm. plant operators

  The Bulgarian municipal waste user charge has been in force since 1951. The charge level per year is determined as a percentage of the value of a dwelling (for households); or as a percentage of the net value of a company or an institutional building. The yearly charge for an average Sofia household in 1994 is (based on 0.04% of the rateable value of the dwelling) 1.1 ECU (70 leva). There are some major shortcomings concerning the effectiveness of the charge. It is possible to use the revenue of this charge for purposes other than treatment of household waste (public health, education etc.). Due to the heavily restricted budgets of the municipalities, this practice has become almost standard. The method of calculating the charge level is not directly related to the volume of waste produced. Data on total revenue on national level are only collected since 1994. Proposals for a new Local (Municipal) Taxes and Charges Act are under discussion. It is expected that the new act will only set out the obligations for payment of taxes and charges, while leaving their level to be determined completely by the municipalities.

  In the case of the Czech waste charges, it must be noted that charges for other types of waste such as special waste, dangerous waste etc. are similarly determined through the waste disposal charges. The municipal waste user charges were set up in many cases even before World War II, however, in 1992, charge levels have been fundamentally raised. The charge in Prague for instance, was ECU 14.53/ton in 1993, while rates in other municipalities are within 60% of this. The significant price increase since 1992 led to inconsistent effects: the number of illegal dumps has increased, as well as the number of citizens who are not willing to pay for this service; also, though it is not possible to quantify exactly the amount of solid waste produced, it seems to have decreased. Solid municipal waste production in the Czech Republic was ca. 5 mln tons in 1993.

Charges on waste disposal

  Table 3 presents an overview of the charges on waste disposal in place in the seven countries assessed.

Table 3. Charges on waste disposal
Charge base and rate Revenue Revenue spending
Czech Republic Imposed on operators of waste dumps.
5 categories of waste are distinguished.
Two rates with different levels for each ca-tegory exist. Rate I is for financial compen-sation of the municipality where the dump is located; rate II is to stimulate to dispose the waste along the required criteria.
Revenue of rate II:
1992: 3.28 mln ECU
1993: 4.94 mln ECU
Rate I: revenue to municipal budget for environmental exp.
Rate II: revenue to SEF (support of projects with respect to national waste policy)
Poland 1.20 - 14.7 ECU/ton (1992)
0.90 - 11.0 ECU/ton (1993)
The charge applies to different waste categories such as: pitch, sludge, motor oil, smears, packages, ashes, etc.
The charge can be imposed on companies.
1992: 44.7 mln ECU
1993: 50.4 mln ECU
(1993=estimation)
20% to NEP+WMF
30% to VEP+WMF
50% to LEP+WMF
Slovak Republic Imposed on operators of waste dumps and waste producers.
5 categories of waste are distinguished.
Two rates with different levels for each ca-tegory exist. Rate I is for financial compen-sation of the municipality where the dump is located; rate II is paid by waste produ-cers, who store waste in landfills that do not fulfill the required criteria.
Revenue of rate II:
1992: 0.05 mln ECU
1993: 0.51 mln ECU
(charge is in force since 6.5.1992)
Rate I: revenue to municipal budget for environmental exp.
Rate II: revenue to SEF (support of projects with respect to national waste policy)

  An example for the rates of the Czech charge on waste disposal is: Rate I for communal waste (category 3) is 0.58 ECU/ton, while rate II is 6.10 ECU/ton. For dangerous waste (category 5), rate I is 7.27 ECU/ton, while rate II is 145.35 ECU/ton. Rate II was phased in over 3 years. In evaluating the effectiveness of this charge (introduced in 1992) a problem is that still no exact evidence of dumps is existing. However, the introduction of these charges positively motivated the establishment of new dumps in accordance with the strict requirements concerning storage of waste. Also, the charges led to an often significant increase for waste storage, which makes waste producers implement rational waste policies. In line with significant changes related to the creation of a consistent waste management policy, the present charges will also be affected.

  In case of the Slovak charge, rate I is for financial compensation of the municipality where the dump is located. Rate II is paid by waste producers, who store waste in landfills that do not meet the required criteria. Rate I is being phased in over five years (final rate in 1996). Examples for 1994: for solid municipal waste (category 3), rate I is 0.31 ECU/ton, while rate II is 0.36 ECU/ton; for dangerous waste (category 5), rate I is 3.89 ECU/ton, while rate II is 0.34 ECU/ton. No significant amendment of the waste regulations are expected within the next two years.

  The main purpose of the Polish waste disposal charges in practice is revenue raising. In 1993, only an estimated 67% of the imposed charges were actually collected (86% in 1992). There are some efforts to collect delinquent charges from the often financially stressed enterprises. However, the inspectorates have limited possibilities for sanctions in case of non-payment and there is also a lack of political support for such action in some cases.

1.2.3 Charges on emissions to surface water

  Two types of waste charges are distinguished: user charges for sewerage and sewage treatment (i.e., charges that are a payment for the service of providing sewerage and sewage treatment), and waste water effluent charges (i.e., charges levied on direct discharges, regardless of actual treatment).

User charges for sewerage and sewage treatment

  The Bulgarian user charges on waste water are in force since 1951. Households, with some small exceptions, do not pay for waste water treatment services, with the difference being compensated for by the public sector. The specific charge levels are calculated, invoiced and collected by the respective (state owned) sewerage companies. Major problems concerning implementation and effectiveness are: legislative gaps in enforcement in case of delayed payment; organizational problems in collecting the charges; lack of motivation to reduce water consumption and decrease waste water quantities, because in most of the residential buildings, collective measurement of water consumption is practiced.

  In Bulgaria, concrete proposals were elaborated in 1993 for the introduction of a new user charge for sewage treatment. The main aim of the proposed charge would be fiscal, in order to enable collective financing for building urban waste water treatment facilities. The proposed charge level is based on the estimated costs for treatment of 1m3 waste water resulting in meeting the requirements for second category water receiver. The specific charge level would be calculated on a quantitative basis, while for companies the degree of pollution would also apply. Provisions for inflation linked rate adjustments were made. The charges would be considered as the operating costs of water treatment facilities. The two main reasons for the delay of the governments approval are: 1) problems with the organization of collecting the charges, and, 2) opposition of some ministries to the charge levels.

Table 4. User charges for sewerage and sewage treatment
Country Charge base and rate Method of measurement
Bulgaria F: waste water discharge or water usage AM
Czech Republic H: waste water discharge or water usage
F: waste water discharge or water usage
AM
AM
Hungary H: waste water discharge or water usage
F: waste water discharge or water usage
AM
AM
Poland H: waste water discharge or water usage
F: waste water discharge or water usage
AM
AM
Slovak Republic H: waste water discharge or water usage
F: waste water discharge or water usage
AM
AM

Key to symbols:
H = Households,
F = Firms,
FR = Flat rate,
AM = Actual measurement

  In the Czech Republic, user charges for sewerage and sewage treatment have been in place for decades. Since 1991, these charges have been significantly raised. The charge is usually to be paid together with the price for drinking water and determined by each municipality. In 1993, the charge for sewerage and sewage treatment in Prague was 0.19 ECU/m3, while the charge for drinking water was 0.24 ECU/m3 (charges in other municipalities are within 50% of this). Ca. 7 mln Czech citizens use sewerage. The significant price increases since 1991 have led to a reduction in water consumption. However, the current charges do not cover all treatment costs, and the municipalities provide subsidies in many cases. It is expected that the charges will be further increased.

  The Hungarian charges for sewerage and sewage treatment are so called "regulated" prices set by the Ministry of Transport, Telecommunication and Water Management. In practice, the charge is high enough to cover just operational costs of an enterprise. Since the costs for providing waste water treatment varies for different regions, charge levels vary as well (between 0.3 - 1.2 ECU/m3). There are two major problems with the way the charge levels are set. First, the depreciation is based on the "old value" of the equipment; therefore only little accumulation is possible for replacement. Second, in those rare cases where the effluent is properly treated the cost and correspondingly the charge is high. Meantime Waterworks with no treatment costs charge less. These pay sewerage fines for their high level of pollution, but the level of that fine is far too low to provide any incentive to lower the pollution content of the effluent.

  The Slovak user charges for sewerage and sewage treatment have been significantly raised since 1991. The charge is usually to be paid together with the price for drinking water and determined by each municipality. In 1993, a typical example for the sewerage and sewage treatment charge was 0.08 ECU/m3, while the charge for drinking water was 0.11 ECU/m3. Ca. 2.7 mln Slovak citizens use sewerage. The significant price increases since 1991 have led to a reduction in water consumption. However, the current charges do not cover all treatment costs, and the municipalities provide subsidies in many cases. It is expected that the charges will be further increased.

Water effluent charges

  Corresponding to the Czech waste water effluent charge is a system of permits. The charges are determined based on self measurement of the enterprises discharging waste water into surface water. The specific amount of the charges depends on the quantity of pollutants in the waste water and on the degree to which the quality of the receiving water is detoriated. Various formulas are specified to determine the charge for a specific pollutant. The system functioned quite well until 1993, however, the charge rates ceased to serve an incentive function, partly because of the influence of inflation (at present they represent ca. 30% of the abatement costs). With respect to the preparation of new legislation on water, the regulations about charges for releasing waste water will be fundamentally amended.

  The Polish waste water effluent charges also utilize a system of permits. The main purpose of these charges in practice is revenue raising. In 1992 and 1993 only about half of the imposed charges have been actually paid. There are some efforts to collect delinquent charges from the often financially stressed enterprises. However, the inspectorates have limited possibilities for sanctions in case of non-payment and there is also a lack of political support for such action in some cases.

  The Romanian waste water charge, in force since 1991, has mainly the character of a fund raising instrument. An essential part of the imposed charges is not being paid, mainly because of insolvency of charged enterprises. The charges are not adjusted to inflation.

Table 5. Water effluent charges
Country Charge base and rate Revenue Revenue spending
Czech Republic
  • BOD5
  • undissolvable substances
  • crude oil substances
  • evident alkalinity and acidity
  • dissolved inorganic salts
The charge can be levied on enterprises.
1992: 26.2 mln ECU
1993: 37.8 mln ECU
Revenue goes to SEF, from where projects are being supported with respect to water protection.
Poland
  • BOD5
    • 1992: 570.3 ECU/t
    • 1993: 428.5 ECU/t
  • COD
    • 1992: 325.8 ECU/t
    • 1993: 244.8 ECU/t
  • suspended solids
    • 1992: 51.1 ECU/t
    • 1993: 38.4 ECU/t
  • heavy metals (total mass)
    • 1992: 5870.6 ECU/t
    • 1993: 4411.1 ECU/t
  • chloride and sulfate ions
    • 1992: 32.3 ECU/t
    • 1993: 24.3 ECU/t
1992: 83.6 mln ECU
1993: 59.9 mln ECU
(1993 = estimation)
36% to NEP+WMF
54% to VEP+WMF
10% to LEP+WMF
for charges on saline coal mining waters (chlorides and sulfates):
90% to NEP+WMF
10% to LEP+WMF
Romania suspendsion + subst. in solution 0.46 ECU/t
oxygen consuming substances 1.86 ECU/t
The charge can be levied on enterprises.
1992: n.a.
1993: n.a.
5% to Water Funds
95% to WIA
Slovak Republic
  • BOD5
  • undissolvable substances
  • crude oil substances
  • alkalinity and acidity
  • dissolved inorganic salts
1992: 10.77 mln ECU
1993: 7.79 mln ECU
Revenue goes to SEF, from where projects are being supported with respect to water protection.
Slovenia 2.40 ECU/E (for 1994)
Emissions are calculated through some elements on the basis of calculating the factor E (population equivalent).
1992: 3.8 mln ECU
1993: 4.9 mln ECU
Revenue goes to the General State Budget.

  Regarding Slovenia, it was reported that as a result of the effluent charges the larger polluters have arranged to have their waste water treated on-site or at public waste water treatment facilities. The charge levels are being adjusted to inflation every year. There are plans to adjust the calculation methodology in connection with new production processes (due to privatization).

  The Slovak waste water effluent charges are based on a system of permits. The charges are determined based on self measurement of the enterprises discharging waste water into surface water. The specific amount of the charges depends on the quantity of pollutants in the waste water and on the degree to which the quality of the receiving water is detoriated. Various formulas are specified to determine the charge for a specific pollutant. The system functioned quite well, however, nowadays the charge rates do not serve its incentive function anymore, because of the influence of inflation and price liberalization. With respect to the preparation of new legislation on water, the regulations about charges for releasing waste water will be amended.

  In Hungary there are plans to introduce a water effluent charge, however, draft legislation is only in an early stage of preparation at present.

1.3. Product charges

  Only one product charge was reported in all 7 countries assessed, the Hungarian fuel charge. It has been in force since in 1992 and is levied on domestic fuel producers and on importers of fuel (i.e., gasoline, diesel oil, lead free fuel). The charge level is 0.8 HUF per liter, which is approximately 0.7 - 1% of the total fuel price (from November 1 the charge level increases to 1.0 HUF per liter). The declared aim of the charge is revenue raising for transport related pollution. Total revenue in 1992 was 8.6 mln ECU, and in 1993 13.6 mln ECU. The revenue is income to the Central Environmental Protection Fund (CEPF), and 75% is earmarked for a yearly program on transport related pollution, with the other 25% not strictly earmarked for transportation issues being allocated by the Minister of Environment. The fuel charge accounts for about. half of the CEPF's income.

  Regulations for additional product charges in Hungary have been prepared for tires, CFC content of refrigerators and packaging materials (the latter as a combined system of product charge/deposit refund). These proposals will be submitted for approval together with the new framework environment protection law (planned for the next months). While the proposal for the tire charge is intended as a mere revenue raising tool for the CEPF (1.2 - 2.3 ECU per new tire; the impact of the charge on the environment is rather unclear according to a feasibility study on the proposal). The proposal for packaging materials is including a provision for a mandatory percentage of reuse (if this percentage is reached, the charge would be refunded). The charge would be levied on "package material with volume" out of glass, metal, plastic or laminated material (not paper and wood). The charge rate would depend on the volume; e.g., for a volume of 1 liter, 0.07 ECU per piece and 0.08 per piece in case of material out of PVC. The revenue would be earmarked for support of recycling industries, however, the expected revenue of each of the charges is only about 5 000 - 10 000 ECU.

  In Bulgaria, an instrument is in place that has a character similar to that of a product charge. Since 1993, an additional import duty is levied for the import of old cars which were first registered before 10 or more years. The additional duty is 10% of the car's value. The revenue goes to the National Environmental Fund. In 1993, the total revenue from this instrument was about 1 mln ECU and presented one third of the total income of the Fund.

  In both, the Czech and Slovak Republic, charges on ozone depleting substances (ODS) are planned to be introduced. Producers and importers of ozone depleting substances would be charged. Czech legislation foresees a charge level of 100 Kc/kg CFC (2.9 ECU/kg at current exchange rate). In Slovak draft legislation, 20 Sk/kg (0.52 ECU/kg) ODS, mainly freons, and, 20-100 Sk per piece of product containing ODS, is proposed. The revenue of these charges would go to the State Environmental Fund in case of both countries. In case of the Czech charge the revenue would be used to support air protection measures, while in Slovakia support would be given to operators who recycle and regenerate ODS.

  In all seven countries assessed, there is a tax differentiation between leaded and unleaded petrol.

1.4. Emission trading

  In Poland an experiment with transferable pollution permits conducted in the Chorzów area proved extremely successful in bringing visible improvements more rapidly and at lower cost than attainable through traditional instruments. The wider replication of such activities, however, cannot be contemplated without amending the environmental law.

  In Hungary, necessary legal provisions for introducing emission trading are included in the draft versions of new general framework law and air legislation. Possibilities for emission trading in the field of air pollution (energy sector) is under discussion in mainly academic circles.

1.5. Deposit refunds

  The following observations concerning the effectiveness of the Czech deposit refund on glass bottles were reported. While the price of bottled products increased but the deposit rate stayed at constant level, the system's effectiveness is declining. Privatization caused temporary break-downs of the whole system (retailers tend to refund only bottles which have been bought at the same place). Compared with the situation before 1990, the number of bottle types to which the law applies, was reduced, while in the meantime the number of different types of bottles and packaging beverages has dramatically increased. At present, a packaging act is being prepared that should also include a complex solution for the deposit refund system. EU-recommendations are used as a frame for the new packaging act.

Table 6. Deposit refund systems
Country Item Rate (% of price) Return percentage
Czech Republic Deposit refund on glass bottles
0.5 l beer bottles
0.7 l wine bottles
1.0 l wine bottles
0.25-0.33 l soft drink bottles
1.0 l soft drink bottles

0.09 ECU/bottle (20-40%)
0.09 ECU/bottle (5-10%)
0.09 ECU/bottle (20-60%)
0.09 ECU/bottle (40-100%)
0.12 ECU/bottle (15-30%)
70-80%(for all types)
Hungary Deposit refund on glass bottles
0.7 l wine bottles
0.5 l beer bottles
1 l soft drink bottles

ca. 0.07 ECU/bottle (<10%)
ca. 0.05 ECU/bottle (15-20%)
ca. 0.11-0.18 ECU/bottle (30-50%)
In 1991:
ca. 70-80%
103%
ca. 70-80%
Poland Dep. ref. on beverage containers
0.5 l cream bottles (glass)
0.5 l beer bottles (glass)
0.7 l wine bottles (glass)
2.0 l soft drink bottles (plastic)

0.06 ECU/bottle (18%)
0.06 ECU/bottle (12-15%)
0.06 ECU/bottle (5-8%)
0.04 ECU/bottle (34%)
n.a.

  In Hungary, there are plans to introduce a new product charge/deposit refund system on packaging material, which would influence the deposit refund currently in force. New experience is being gained with returnable PET bottles. While the market shares for beer and wine bottles (ca. 95% and 80% respectively) is high, for soft drink bottles it is ca. 30% and 10% in case of returnable PET bottles. As shown in Table 6, the return rate of beer bottles was 103% in 1991 according to official data. This apparently was due to the contribution of "imported" beer bottles from neighbor countries.

  In Poland, the level of deposit rates depends on voluntary negotiations between industry and retailers. The deposit refund on 2l plastic soft drink bottles has been in force since the beginning of 1994. It is expected that the list of containers (e.g. for other beverages) being subject to deposit refund will be extended.

1.6. Enforcement incentives

Bulgaria

  Apart from the fines in the areas of air, water and soil, mentioned in Table 7, there are also fines in place in the areas of noise, electromagnetic fields and mineral extraction. However, the latter three are not enforced at present. In case of noise and electromagnetic fields this is due to the lack of measuring equipment in the Inspectorates. All fines are in force since 1978. The last amendment of the respective regulations took place in 1993, when the fine levels were raised by 16 times, compensating for the increase of prices in 1990. At present, there is no regulatory mechanism for indexing according to inflation occurring in the past years. However, it was reported that there are indications that the fines provide incentive to decrease pollution in some cases, because of the increase of the rates in 1993 and also due to the financial independence of companies after the cessation of state subsidies in almost all branches. On the other hand, it is the ongoing practice of some companies to prefer regular payment of the fines, rather than taking necessary abatement or preventative measures. This effect supports the second function of the fines, namely to provide revenue for financing environmental activities (70% of the income goes to the National Environmental Protection Fund, while 30% goes to the respective municipality). In 1993, the revenue from fines contributed ca. 60% of the total revenue of the National Environmental Protection Fund.

  About 70% of the imposed fines are actually collected. The reasons for this shortcoming are legislative gaps with respect to the enforcement of sanctions on delayed payments. The monitoring costs of the Inspectorates to control the compliance with the standards are rapidly growing. The relative cost share of administering the fines is varying up to 30% of the income. The practice of the past few years did not prove the expected effect of the "polluter pays principle". The continued dominance of state owned companies in the most important economic sectors, the extensive capital investments needed for meeting the rather stringent standards, as well as the widening of the private sector mainly in small enterprises, present difficult conditions for the implementation of the fines. It is expected that in the short term the fine levels would be updated again, while in the long term the fines could be replaced by pollution charges.

Czech Republic

  Non compliance fees are in place for both air pollution and waste water in addition to existing emission/effluent charges.

  The importance of the air - non compliance fee is expected to increase with the gradual tightening up of the emission charges. Strict application takes place only for new sources (established in 1992 or later) and at present the number of these is still very limited. It is under consideration to change the air non compliance fee into a fully regional instrument, with the allocation of all revenue to the municipality where the fee was imposed.

  The non compliance fee on waste water is determined as a certain percentage of the waste water effluent charge to be added to the actual effluent charge level if water standards are exceeded. This percentage is being calculated by taking into account the extent by which the standards are exceeded and specific deterioration constants given for the five waste water categories on which the effluent charge is also based. The functioning of this fee is affected by several exemptions to levying the fee: the fee is not levied on public institutions (schools, hospitals etc.); only 20% of the calculated fee must be paid by public sewerage operators; and, the maximum fee that can be imposed must not be higher than the respective effluent charge. Along with the preparation of a new Water Act, new methodologies for dealing with the waste water non compliance fee are under consideration; it is even possible that these fees would be abolished.

  Various possibilities are defined in Czech environmental legislation to levy penalties in case of infringement of special regulations. Such penalties are in the range of 300 ECU - 0.3 mln ECU. In practice, penalties are used rather infrequently and usually the lowest possible rate is levied. This instrument is much more of a enforcement tool than an economic incentive tool. It is planned to assess the efficiency of the penalties and also to gradually unify the penalties for separate areas in order to ensure a consistent system of penalties.

Table 7. Non compliance fees ("Fines")
Country Type (proportional to) Revenue Revenue spending
Bulgaria Air (emission concentration, working hours, exceedance of standards)

Water (emission concentration, working hours, exceedance of standards)

Soil (damaged area, dangerousness of polluting substances)

1992: 0.30 mln ECU
1993: 0.70 mln ECU

1992: 0.49 mln ECU
1993: 1.11 mln ECU

1992: 0.43 mln ECU
1993: 0.33 mln ECU

(total revenue)

The revenue of all fines is to be used for environmental expenditures. 30% goes to respective municipalities and 70% to NEPF.
Czech Republic Air (exceedance of standards results in a fine of up to 50% of standard charge)

Water (exceedance of standards, in connection with water effluent charges)

Penalties on infringement of specific environmental laws

1992: 0 ECU
1993: 0 ECU

ca. 20% of waste water
effluent charges

n.a.

Revenue goes to SEF

Revenue goes to SEF

Partly to SEF, partly to municipalities

Hungary Air (exceedance of standards, operating time, regional factors, emission height, etc.)

Water (discharge volume, emission conc., type of receiving water, other factors)

Hazardous waste (quantity of waste, hazardousness of waste)

Others: sewerage, waste import, noise, nature conservation (the latter 3 fines do not generate significant revenues)

1992: 2.5 mln ECU
1993: 3.3 mln ECU

1992: 2.3 mln ECU
1993: 1.5 mln ECU

1992: 0.37 mln ECU
1993: 0.41 mln ECU

(Note: all figures
are CEPF income only)

Revenue of the fines is used for environmental expenditures. 30% to respective municipalities and 70% to CEPF. (revenue of sewerage fines go to service companies.)
Poland Air (10 times the regular SO2 and NOx charges)

Water (depends on quantity, temperature, pH, contents of waste water)

Waste disposal (1/20 of the annual disposal charge/ ton and number of days of depositing waste without valid permit)

1992: 1.46 mln ECU
1993: 0.30 mln ECU

1992: 4.98 mln ECU
1993: 4.64 mln ECU

1992: 0.27 mln ECU
1993: 0.07 mln ECU

(all 1993 data = est.)

same as with air emission charges

same as with waste water effluent charges

same as with waste disposal charges

Romania Air

Water

Energy consumption

Others (waste import, land protection, nature conservation)

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

WIA and Water Fund of Romania

n.a.

n.a.

Slovak Republic Air (exceedance of standards results in a fine of up to 50% of standard charge)

Water (exceedance of standards, in connection with water effluent charges)

Other infringement of environmental law

1992: 0 ECU
1993: 0 ECU

incorporated into revenue
of ww effl. ch.

1992: 0.53 mln ECU
1993: 0.77 mln ECU

Revenue goes to SEF

Revenue goes to SEF

Partly to SEF, partly to municipalities

Hungary

  The levels of all fines in force are far too low to serve as incentives for changing polluting behavior. Since 1989, inflation has not been adjusted for in the fee levels. In fact, in most cases they are still the same as when the fines were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s (except for the waste water and the sewerage fees, where levels were doubled in 1993, but which are still far from incentive levels). The fines are mostly based on self reporting of a long list of pollutants (e.g., 200 pollutants in the case of the air pollution fine). Enforcement and the collection of fines are generally designed assuming that polluters are few and rather large. This is no longer the case, however, with an increasing number of small and medium sized enterprises requiring greater administrative efforts and thus resulting in higher administrative costs. Another complication concerns the calculation mechanisms of some instruments. For instance the air, noise and waste water fines are quite complicated, and include a number of parameters which are to be set specifically for each polluter. In fact, the fine system currently in place is neither effective as an enforcement tool, nor was designed to be. Its sole purpose is to generate revenues. Internal ministerial mechanisms for administering the fine system are inefficient, only about 50% of fines levied are actually collected.

1.7. Summary

  Emission charges User charges Tax diff. Product charges Deposit refunds Enforcement incentives
air waste water mun. waste sewerage and sewage gasoline (lead cont.)   glass bottles* non-compliance fees
Bulgaria     (x) x x x     applied in various fields
Czech Republic x x x x x x (CFCs) x in connection with emission charges
Hungary (x)   (x)   x x fuel
(packaging material), (tires), (refrigerators)
x applied in various fields
Poland x x x   x x   x in connection with emission charges
Romania     x     x     applied in various fields
Slovak Republic x x x   x x (CFCs)   in connection with emission charges
Slovenia     x     x      

Note:
Symbol or text in parenthesis means that the instrument is planned to be introduced.

In Hungary, municipal waste user charges are in force in some municipalities. In Slovenia, both municipal waste user charges and sewerage and sewage user charges are in force on local level.

* In Poland and Hungary, also soft drink bottles made from plastic are subject to the deposit refund system

2. Factors effecting the implementation of economic instruments for environmental protection

  In the following, some general conditions and circumstances under which economic instruments are operating are discussed.

Economic transformation

  The seven countries covered in this study are advancing through transformations from centrally planned to market-based economies at different rates and along different paths. However, there are many features of the transition period common to all of the countries which directly affect the working efficiency of economic instruments. It is obvious that advancement in the privatization process has a crucial influence on the working efficiency of economic instruments. In a recently published report, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, Transition Report, October 1994) estimated that in mid 1994 65% of GDP in the Czech Republic was produced by the private sector, with the figure for Hungary, Poland and Slovakia being 55%, while Bulgaria (40%), Romania (35%) and Slovenia (30%) follow. Privatization of large heavy industries (often very pollution intensive), however, has yet to take place on a large scale. The sharp cuts in state subsidies to companies are, nonetheless, creating conditions for real competition as well as enterprise restructuring taking place mainly through privatization. In addition, price liberalization on a large scale has been committed to in most of the countries, with some exceptions such as in the energy sector.

  Efficient implementation of economic instruments is hindered by the great differences in levels of modernization and profitability of enterprises, and the fast growing number of small new enterprises. Some enterprises have adapted very quickly to the changing circumstances while others are foundering. Data indicating the differences between imposed charges and fines and amounts actually paid show an inability and in some cases an unwillingness of enterprises to pay. Furthermore, inflation, still relatively high in all of the countries (the lowest rate, in the Czech Republic, remains almost three times higher than the EU average) has the effect of eroding the value of fixed charge and tax levels. Only in a few cases are there mechanisms in place to adjust for inflation. In some countries, for instance fine levels have not been adjusted since 1989.

  Most sectors of society are experiencing economic hardship. The governments in these countries seriously lack financial resources and many of the citizens are also struggling as their buying power and salaries are low in comparison with EU averages. While it is true that incomes in the region have risen they have not kept pace with inflation and the steadily rising costs of living. Most households are facing tight financial situations and this is a decisive factor in political decision making. Citizens are often strongly resistant to paying more (or anything at all) for services like household waste management or sewerage treatment, though it is rational to require the users of those services to bear their costs.

Lack of political and social support

  The sometimes quick and dramatic changes in the political landscape and government leadership adversely effect the continuity of ongoing work. The political will and courage to deal seriously with the issue of environmental protection is rather low outside the Ministries of Environment. There is also a decline of public interest in the issue of environmental protection over the recent years. The understanding of the issue in high decision making levels is generally rather limited, also there is not much interest.

Capacity for dealing with market-based mechanisms

  There is simply a lack of experience and expertise in CEE with designing and implementing market-based environmental protection policies and mechanisms. While some types of pollution charges and fines have officially been in use in the region for many years such mechanisms often existed only on paper or were mainly symbolic under the previous government systems. Experience with economic instruments for environmental protection in market-based economies is still developing and additional knowledge and expertise is needed to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of such instruments. The capacity of environmental authorities and industrial managers to develop and operate economic instruments should be enhanced through training, information exchange and dialogue building. Governments have the added challenge to maintain that capacity once it is developed.

Revenue raising tools or pollution reduction incentives?

  The various economic instruments in use in the countries studied were generally reported to have the functions of both revenue raising and pollution reduction. While their ability to raise money is demonstrated with some clarity their effectiveness as incentives to stop or alter polluting practices is questionable. The governments of these countries are experiencing economic hardship and the amount of funds available for public expenditures of any kind, let alone environmental expenditures is very lifted, thus there is strong motivation for generating financial resources however possible. The current emphasis on revenue raising using charge and fine levels which are generally relatively low (compared to Pigouvian levels), however, does little to actually influence the behavior of many polluters. Indeed, funds now being routinely extracted from polluters are often redistributed to the public sector to support public service facilities such as water treatment plants and heating and power plants. The charges are too low to encourage polluters to reduce emissions and at the same time they deprive the polluters of funds which they might otherwise be encouraged or required to invest in pollution reduction or prevention measures.

The role of earmarked funds

  Economic instruments have with few exceptions the basic function of revenue raising tools for state expenditures in environmental protection and investments. In all countries assessed, except for Slovenia and Romania, there are specially earmarked funds for environmental expenditures in place on national level and in Poland for instance also on regional (Voivodship) and local level. These funds play a significant role in spending the revenue of most charges, taxes, fees and fines described in section 1. In Slovenia, an Environmental Protection Fund was established in July 1994 and it appears that also in Romania this possibility is taken into consideration. The significance of the economic instruments as revenue sources, as well as some key characteristics of 5 National Environmental Protection Funds are shown in table 9.

  The use of main parts of the revenue collected through economic instruments happens through these funds. All but the Polish Fund, which is an independent institution, are based within the administrative structure of the respective Ministry of Environment. The Fund's revenues are spent on a long term basis according to priorities outlined in the national environmental policies, or in the case of Hungary the Ministry's "conceptual settings". The Fund's attempt to meet the long term objectives of national policies through the formulation of annual budgets or "Programs" in which specific priorities are established. Two examples shall be given at this point: In Bulgaria, in 1993, a total of US$ 2.3 mln was allocated from the Fund, of which 31.7 % were interest free loans to companies, 19.4% as subsidies to municipalities, 40.5 % as grants for improving the environmental monitoring system of the country, and 5.5 % grants for scientific research works related to the environment. In the Czech Republic, in the period of 1992-1993, from a total of US$ 223.4 mln 50.6% was invested in waste water treatment plants, 13.2% in heat plant conversion to gas, 10% in city fuel conversions to gas, and others 26.2%. From these investments, 63.8% went to municipalities, 24.9% to enterprisers, and 11.3% to public and private institutions.

Table 9. Key characteristics of five National Environmental Protection Funds in Central and Eastern Europe
(Taken from REC's "National Environmental Protection Funds in Central and Eastern Europe", 1994)
Key Characteristics Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic
1993 National Fund environmental expenditures 2.3 mln US$ 107.0 mln US$ 27.7 mln US$ 198.5 mln US$ 34.7 mln US$
(as a % of total national environmental expenditures) (7 %) (10 %) (11 %) (22 %) (20 %)
1993 revenues 3.6 mln US$ 101.0 mln US$ 36.3 mln US$ 284.0 mln US$ 30.8 mln US$
Major revenue sources (with % of total value) - pollution fines (58%)
- additional import duty on used cars (33%)
- water charges (41%)
- air charges (30%)
- waste charges (13%)
- "land" charges (12%)
- fuel tax (44%)
- traffic transit fee (20%)
- PHARE support (19%)
- pollution fines (17%)
- air emission charges
- wastewater charges
- water use charges
- waste charges
- State Budget (37%)
- waste water charges (30%)
- air emission charges (25%)
Primary disbursement mechanisms in 1993 (with % of total expenditures) - grants (68%)
- interest free loans (32%)
- grants (71%)
- loans (29%)
- grants
- interest free loans
- soft loans(77%)
- grants (17%)
- interest subsidies (6%)
- grants
Major fields of 1993 expenditures (with % of total value) - monitoring system (40%)
- loans to companies (32%)
- subsidies to municipalities (19%)
- water (58%)
- air (33%)
- air (70%)
- waste (15%)
- water (11%)
- air (47%)
- water (35%)
- other, i.e., soil, nature protection, monitoring, education, emergencies (18%)
- water (48%)
- air (27%)
- waste (8%)

Evolving regulatory framework

  While in the Czech and Slovak Republics, also in Poland, new environmental legislation has been enacted after 1989, including general framework laws and some of the important sectoral acts (air, water, waste etc.), in Bulgaria and Slovenia only framework laws have just recently been passed. Hungary and Romania are still relying on outdated legislation which has been partly modified to adapt to the new circumstances. As Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics attempt to amend and fine-tune their newer legislation, the adoption of new general as well as sectoral laws is high on the priority list of the Ministries of Environment of the other countries.

  In most of the seven countries studied government environmental decision making is officially based on the national environmental policy or strategy. However, main challenges remain in all countries to evaluate and define concrete and feasible qualitative and quantitative objectives in the short and long term, as well as in harmonizing aims of environmental policies with other sectoral policies. Environmental regulation generally is not as comprehensive or coordinated as it could be and as policy tools, economic instruments should be designed and implemented taking more fully into consideration cross-sector impacts and opportunities for integration of environmental protection and economic development.

Enforcement problems

  It is well known that major problems with the implementation of environmental policy in the CEE countries are connected with enforcement. The concept of the rule of law as a social norm is not as firmly established in the society as it is in most Western democracies. To some extent there remains from the previous political system a rather casual regard of law as something which should look good on paper but not necessarily firmly anchored in practice. The enforcement difficulties associated with such a mentality are exacerbated by the declining power of government authorities generally occurring in the countries. Some polluters simply do not comply with the regulations because they believe that they will be able to avoid suffering the consequences.

Impractical regulations

  Closely related to the issue of enforcement are the nature and feasibility of the regulations guiding the economic instruments. In some cases the regulations are simply not very practical. In the case of fines for instance, they may be unrealistically strict and inflexible or require extremely complicated and complex calculations, involving numerous valuables and possible exceptions. The heavy use of fines on emissions exceeding some permissible level should also be questioned, because to accurately determine such fines on a consistent basis would require comprehensive modern environmental monitoring systems, the likes of which are not yet common in the region. It seems that it is more practical and reliable to use emission or product charges based on simple modes of operation.

Decentralization

  Local authorities are often and increasingly involved in the implementation of economic instruments for environmental protection. In some cases there are several different government levels and offices involved in the functioning of a single mechanism. The instrument may be designed and established at the national level, specific emission levels set by the local authorities, with monitoring and money collecting conducted by regional inspectorates. While there clearly are benefits to involving local authorities who have direct stakes in the local conditions and unique local knowledge there are also added administrative expenses with each level of government involvement. Professional capacity at the local level is also a serious issue as environmental protection responsibilities are increasingly decentralized.


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