PART II: Case Examples from Central and Eastern Europe

The Krsko Nuclear Power Plant
Slovenia

Barbara Vrecko

Background

The Krsko nuclear power plant was the first nuclear power plant in the former Yugoslavia. It was built in Slovenia near the Croatian border as part of a partnership project between Slovenia and Croatia. After six years of construction, it began producing energy in 1983. Assuming a normal 40-year life expectancy of the average nuclear power plant, the Krsko plant can be expected to remain in operation until the year 2023. NGOs have attempted to close the plant since it began operation.

Problems/Effects

Several problems have been attributed to the operation of the plant.

The issue of radioactive waste disposal presents the first major problem, especially since this problem has not been successfully addressed even after thirteen years of operation. Radioactive fuel is now stored in cooling pools inside the plant, but this capacity will be exhausted by 2003 at the latest. In addition, medium and low radioactive waste is being compressed and stored at the facility. Attempts to find a suitable storage site for the lower level radioactive waste have been unsuccessful, due to local resistance.

The operation of the plant presents several other ongoing safety questions. For instance, the plant was built according to specifications that pre-date the Three Mile Island accident, and the plant has not been upgraded to reflect the revision of standards since that incident. In addition, it has been reported that the plant is located in a seismic area sensitive to earthquakes. And some reports suggest the plant never received the proper building permits, increasing suspicion about the safety of its operation. It is feared that any serious problems at the plant could endanger the entire region, including all of Slovenia and Croatia.

Opposition to the plant is also complicated by a political problem resulting from the original construction agreement. While it has never been clearly established that Slovenia has a critical need for the energy generated by the plant, it is bound by contract to deliver half of the energy to Croatia, which, as a result of war in the region, is heavily dependent on power from the Krsko plant. For this reason, Slovenian NGOs are not fully convinced that any successful domestic opposition to the plant can result in closing it down.

Strategies Employed

The first stage: The anti-nuclear movement in the former Yugoslavia was very strong and consisted of NGOs from all republics. It also collaborated with similar groups in neighboring countries such as Italy and Austria. The movement was initially quite successful - in 1987 it achieved a moratorium adopted by the government on building more nuclear power plants in the former Yugoslavia. Between 1987 and 1988, there was also a movement called "Aple/Jardan without nuclear facilities" which comprised environmental groups from the former Yugoslavia, Italy and Austria. The Green Movement organized anti-nuclear demonstrations in Slovenia as part of the election campaign in 1990. The closure of the nuclear power plant Krsko was part of their election campaign and was adopted as a government project after the elections.

Second stage: After the elections, the Green Movement was transformed into a political party and tried to pass a law by referendum on the closure of the Krsko nuclear power plant. They have tried to have this law passed through parliamentary procedure several times in the past six years but without success. During the first elections, the Green Movement was able to delegate through Green Party members to parliament, but later efforts to close the plant then stalled, as representatives were unable to push resolutions to close the plant through parliament. This was attributed to several obstacles. First, the opponents of the plant were unable to present a clear alternative to the energy that would be lost by the closure. Second, it was never clear that the government could break its contract with Croatia to share power.

The last attempt occurred in 1995, when, pressed by the leadership of the ruling liberal democratic party, members withdrew their signatures and the attempt was dismissed in response. Concerned MPs looked to the NGO community to collect signatures calling for a referendum on the closure of Krsko. (A minimum of 40,000 signatures is required by law from the voting public in order to gain call a referendum.)

In addition to the politicians' involvement, domestic and international NGOs such as Greenpeace and Global 2000 also tried to organize signature collections to close the plant.

A total of 2,100 valid signatures were collected, despite international assistance and involvement in the campaign. From the very beginning there has hardly been any support from the local population. Unfortunately, there was no cooperation with the Croatian environmental NGOs in this effort and also, the Croatian government has never been approached officially. Subsequent efforts made by international groups have met with collective opposition in Slovenia. The Slovenian public perceives this as political opportunism and the involvement of the foreign and international environmental groups as attempts by outsiders to influence Slovenian domestic affairs.

STAKEHOLDERS

Government:
Foreign: Croatian Government
National: Slovenian Government Slovenian Parliament, concerned MPs
NGOs:
National, international: Slovenian NGOs Italian NGOs Global 2000, Austria Greenpeace
Business:

Westinghouse Corporation
Other:

Pro-nuclear lobbies
Green Party of Slovenia

Outcome

As the above comments indicate, efforts to close the plant have been unsuccessful so far. In fact, the repeated defeat of these efforts seems for now to have diminished the importance of the issue as a concern among the public in Slovenia even though international groups continue to oppose the plant. This problem has shown the weakness of the Slovenian NGO sector who very often perceive a coordinating and cooperating effort of one NGO as an attempt to monopolize an issue. The international organizations' involvement, in this case, withheld progress and caused negative feelings among the residents because they neither understood the domestic situation nor involved the population in their actions.

Subsequently, it appears that the whole project is an untouchable political issue. Since the nuclear power plant is 50 percent owned by Croatia, it would need a political initiative from the Slovenian government to negotiate closure with Croatia. Even a positive outcome in a referendum would be insufficient to force the government to close the plant. The involved parties failed to present alternatives which would enable Slovenia to overcome the energy problem in the case of the closure. There has been very little discussion among experts and limited information was given to the public.

Give and take: The basis of transboundary cooperation

Lessons Learned

Krsko exemplifies the obstacles transboundary public participation should or will have to overcome in Central and Eastern Europe.

Slovenian voters negatively perceived the involvement of foreign environmental groups since they saw this as an intrusion into their internal affairs. If the initiative had been taken exclusively or decisively by Slovenian NGOs, it might have had more chance of success. Such an independent action was not possible, this shows the relative weakness of cooperation among Slovenian NGOs and the damage such competition and mistrust can breed.
The repeated use of political approaches - in this case using Krsko several times as an election issue - without some assurance of success, can decrease public sensitivity to the urgency of environmental issues and fails to recognize the political dimensions of many issues.
Due to the highly politicized nature of the transboundary issue, and especially the postwar situation and Croatian energy problems, cooperation and support from public, NGOs and MPs from both sides of the border is essential. Although clearly in this case, even with complete support - among the authorities, elected officials or the public - without support and effort on both sides of the border the issue cannot be resolved. Acting unilaterally in this instance may be neither effective nor politically expedient.
Public education on deeply disputed, sensitive issues requires a comprehensive, coordinated approach as part of a wider strategy to achieve a specific goal. In this case, sporadic, general opposition on behalf of the NGOs and MPs gave supporters the opportunity to counter NGO efforts with public appeals and effective lobbying of the concerned governments.
The involvement of international and foreign NGOs sometimes can do more harm than good if their efforts are not strategically coordinated with domestic NGOs in the affected countries, and with the interests of the local population.
The power of business interests to influence governmental officials should not be underestimated or ignored, but countered by effective NGO lobbying or through building strategic alliances with business interests.

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