Annex 3. Water

A3.1. Water and Sewage Prices

Table A3: End-User Water and Sewage Prices for Households in Central and Eastern Europe, 1994 and 1997
Country End user prices at the end of 1994 in US Cents/m3 End user prices at the end of 1997 in US Cents/m3
Prices in capital city Range of prices in whole country Prices in capital city Range of prices in whole country
Water Sewage Total Water Sewage Total Water Sewage Total Water Sewage Total
Bosnia & H. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 39 17 56 n.a.1 n.a.1 n.a.1
Bulgaria                 142     13-342
Croatia                        
Czech Republic                 683     48-993
Estonia 11 15 26 11-29 8-29 19-50 42 44 86 13-42 14-44 27-86
Hungary 23 19 42 26-63 13-162 39-225 33 35 68 21-79 15-59 36-138
Latvia                        
Lithuania4 15 10 25 3-16 3-20 6-36 16 19 35 16-37 17-44 33-81
FYR Maceddonia           25           24
Poland                        
Romania 12 1 13 2-51 1 2-52 18 4 22 4-100 3-38 7-138
Slovakia 12 9 21 12 9 21 18 9 27 18 9 27
Slovenia       11-89 3-41 14-130       10-925 2-405 12-1325
FR Yugoslavia                   24 14 34

Notes:
1) After the war, water pricing is not re-established in many municipalities 2) It is unclear yet whether the figure refers to water price only or includes sewage charges.
3) Data refer to 1996.
4) Water and sewage prices for municipal companies and industry are higher, in some municipalities prices for industry are up to 100% higher. 4) Average price for whole country.
5) The prices are set by the Government quarterly. Current prices are not cost covering. The prices presented in the table are the prices set on April 30, 1997 and the average prices in the country were: USD 0.36 for water and USD 0.12 for sewage.

A3.2. Water Effluent Charges and Taxes (in addition to sewage charges)

Table A1: Air Pollution Charges and Fines in Central and Eastern Europe
Country Type Goal / function Subject: who pays Basis and # of pollutants chargeable Factors determining charge rates Level (end 97') (USD/t) Indexed for inflation? Revenue leaders Yearly revenue (mln USD) Yearly revenue / capita (USD) Collection efficiency (%) Revenue distribution Effectiveness / comments
Bulgaria NCF Compl RR Enterprises 27 water pollutants Quan, Use, ExceedS, Time, MinS, Tox, Regio complex formula No but to national minimum salary BOD?, COD? 1994: 0.71
1995: 0.66
1996: 0.35
1997: n.a.
1994: 0.08
1995: 0.08
1996: 0.04
1997: n.a.
1994: 48.3
1995: 55.0
1996: 59.7
1997: n.a
70% NEF
30% SEF
Legislative gaps. Fines too low for giving incentive. 80% waiver available if investments in pollution reduction are done. New water law in preparation.
Croatia EC RR Incent Natural/legal persons discharging wastewater n.a. Quan, Use, Tox, Purif, ExceedS complex formula n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Public water managem. enterprises Charge waiver available if invest-ments in pollution reduction are done. Reduced rates for waste-water treated prior to discharge.
Czech Republic EC (a) Incent RR Enterprises 5 water pollutants / quality indicators Quan, Concentr., Tox complex formula No BOD 1994: 28.9
1995: 24.6
1996: 20.9
1997: 15.9
1994: 2.8
1995: 2.4
1996: 2.0
1997: 1.5
1994: n.a.
1995: n.a.
1996: n.a.
1997: n.a.
100% NEF (earmark.f. water qual. programs)  
NCF Compl ExceedS progressive n.a. n.a. n.a.
Estonia EC Incent RR industrial & water management companies 7 water pollutants Quan, Tox, Use, Regio BOD7: 95
N: 79
P: 143
No, but revised each year. BOD7, N, P 1994: 0.61
1995: 1.21
1996: 1.41
1997: 1.41
1994: 0.4
1995: 0.8
1996: 0.9
1997: 0.9
"rather high" 100% NEF (earmark.f. water qual. programs) Charges are too low to stimulate constructing new water treatm. facilities. The 50% allowance given to polluters that follow the requirements of permits had po-sitive effects. Weakness is the permit system; it will be impro-ved by applying IPPC Directive.
NCF Compl BOD7:474
N: 395
P: 7132
Hungary NCF12 Compl RR point sources discharging into surface water 32 water pollutants Quan, Tox, Time, Use, ExceedS, Concentr, Regio complex formula No n.a. 1994: 2.1
1995: 3.5
1996: 2.7
1997: 1.8
1994: 0.2
1995: 0.3
1996: 0.3
1997: 0.2
n.a. 70% NEF
30% SB
The charge rates are too low to cover costs to substantially decrease discharges. Even the revenue raising function of the fine is not fulfilled very effectively. Because of financial troubles many charged firms do not pay the fine.
Latvia EC Incent RR Legal/natural persons discharging chargeable water pollution 36 water pollutants (based on self reporting) Quan, Tox, Concentr BOD: 50
N: 50
P: 50
No n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 40% NEF
60% SEF
There is a charge waiver available to subsidize the financing of water pollution related investment projects which are accepted by the Ministry of Environment.
NCF Compl 3 x EC for emissions above the limit; 12 x EC for illegal or no reporting 100% NEF
Lithuania EC Incent RR Legal & natural persons discharging pollutants into water bodies 51 water pollutants Quan, Tox BOD:109
N: 109
P: 370
Quarterly indexation. n.a. n.a.4 n.a.4 n.a. 30% NB
70% SEF
The incentive function of the current system is probably low. Proposed new legislation foresees: decrease of # of chargeable pollutants, revised rates which better reflect environm. Policy priorities, simplification especially of the NCF system.
NCF Compl, RR like EC3, and: ExceedS, Use according to formulas 50-60% (est.)5 100% NEF
Poland EC RR Incent All entities discharging waste water to water/soil 6 water pollutants Quan, Tox, Source7 BOD: 992
COD: 557
Yes BOD5??
COD??
1994: 91.36
1995: 104.66
1996: 106.36
1997: n.a.
1994: 2.46
1995: 2.76
1996: 2.86
1997: n.a.
1994: 45%6
1995: 36%6
1996: 57%6
1997: n.a.
36% NEF
64% SEF8
Proposed changes in the EC: liquidation of the charge differentiation relating to sources/sectors; and, charges rates interrelated with amount of waste water discharged.
NCF Compl BOD: ??
COD: ??
Romania EC RR Incent ?Firms? ca. 15 classes of pollutants Quan, Tox? BOD: 6
DSS: 1.5
Indexed quarterly BOD?, DSS? n.a. n.a. "very poor" n.a. Overall, enterprises have reduced emissions and started using less polluting technology. The fee rates are very low - no real incentive function. Increased rates are proposed.
NCF Compl Firms (effl. above per-mitted levels) 20 poll. (only BOD & DSS are enforced) Quan, Tox, ExceedS ?? like EC? BOD, DSS 1994: n.a.
1995: n.a.
1996: 1.1
1997: n.a.
1994: 0.03
1995: n.a.
1996: 0.05
1997: n.a.
1993: 24%
1995: n.a.
1996: 16%
1997: <15%
100% NB9
Slovakia EC Incent RR each polluter requesting a discharge permit 5 water pollutants / quality indicators Quan, Tox, Concentr complex formula No BOD 1994: 6.9
1995: 6.9
1996: 7.6
1997: 5.8
1994: 1.3
1995: 1.3
1996: 1.4
1997: 1.1
50-60% 100% NEF EC: Surcharges up to 200 % of base rate may be levied to reflect a high level of damage to receiving waters. The wording of the regulation also allows the surcharge to be decreased or forgiven. NCF: payment discipline is weak.
NCF Compl who violated environm. provisions in water law level of violation level of violation fixed penalties 1994: 0.4
1995: 0.3
1996: 0.3
1997: 0.3
1994: 0.07
1995: 0.06
1996: 0.06
1997: 0.05
1994: n.a.
1995: 39%
1996: n.a.
1997: 70%
100% NEF
Slovenia NCF / EC10 Incent Compl Industry & providers of public services COD & heavy metals (Hg, Cd, Cr, Ni, Pb,Cu)11 Quan, Tox, Concentr COD: 15011 Charge rate adjusted periodically COD? n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. If 50% of the charge value are invested in measures to improve discharges: charge exemption. It is planned to increase the charge rates by a factor 6-7 by year 2000.
FR Yugoslavia: Republic of Montenegro EC RR Incent Firms > 10 water pollutants/ indicators Quan, Tox BOD: 100
COD: 53
N: 23
P:167
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1991: ca. 40% 100% Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Water Polluters with monitoring equip-ment have to pay. Most of them lack such equipment and they are charged sewage charges instead.

Abbreviations:
Type: NCF = non-compliance fee; EC = emission charge.
Goal/function: Compl = Compliance; RR = revenue raising; Incent = incentive function.
Factors determining charge rates: Quan = quantity of emissions; Use = type of water use (drinking water, fishery etc.) where effluent goes; ExceedS = exceedance of standard; Purif = level of purification of wastewater before emitting it; Concentr = concentration of pollutants in water; Time = time period of emissions; MinS = minimal salary of the country; Tox = toxicity of pollutants; Regio = regional factors; Source = source of effluent (i.e., charge differentiation by economic sector).
Level / revenue leaders: DSS = dissolved suspended substances.
Revenue distribution: NEF = national environmental fund; SEF = sub-national environmental fund; NB = national budget; SB = sub-national budget.

Notes:
Water pollution non-compliance fees are also in force in Croatia and FR Yugoslavia. They are not described in detail here because they have no dynamic rates (i.e., they are penalty instruments with fixed rates).
Estonia: 1) The data listed represent total revenue from both, emission charge and non-compliance fee. 2) For emissions without permit the rates are: BOD7 - 947$, Nitrogen - 791$, Phosphorus - 1426$.
Lithuania: 3) If an emission source has emissions of one pollutant above the standard, the NCF in Lithuania has to be paid for all pollutant emissions of a source not just for the one for which the standard is exceeded. Consequently, this system has the potential to create very high marginal penalty rates and therefore provides substantial incentive for a pollution source to comply with standards. 4) Revenue data are only available for all ECs and NCFs in force in Lithuania (i.e., EC and NCF on air poll., EC and NCF on water pollution, NCF on waste disposal): total revenue from pollution charges was USD 4.9 mln in 1994 and USD 17.8 mln in 1997 (i.e., yearly revenue/capita was USD 1.3 in 1994 and USD 4.8 in 1997); total revenue from pollution fines was USD 0.3 mln in 1994 and USD 1.3 mln in 1997 (i.e., yearly revenue/capita was USD 0.1 in 1994 and USD 0.4 in 1997). 5) This percentage is an estimation for the collection efficiency of all pollution charges in force in Lithuania (air and water emission charges and all non-compliance fees).
Poland: 6) Data are for EC ??and?? NCF (to be clarified - probably only for EC). The collection efficiency for charges on saline water (from mining) is very low: 12% in 1994; 5% in 1995; 14% in 1996. 7) Charge differentiation according to source or economic sector discharging wastewater is made in case of BOD5 and COD only. Chlorate and sulfate ions in saline water are charged differently when discharged directly to surface water or when discharged to dosing acquifers. 8) 10% of total revenue goes to local (gmina) funds and 54% to regional (voivod) funds, except for charges on saline mining wastewater discharges where the revenue distribution is as follows: 10% gmina funds; 90% NEF (or 50%-50%?.).
Romania: 9) In case of charged enterprises with a pollution permit, the revenue goes to the Water Fund; if an enterprise without a permit is charged, the revenue goes to the State Budget.
Slovenia: 10) The Slovenian wastewater charge is a mixed NCF/EC: for industrial wastewater, the charge has to be paid only when legally fixed minimal concentration standards are exceeded - therefore the charge has a non-compliance function. The charge was introduced in 1995. 11) From the year 2000, also organic halogenated compounds will be chargeable, and, from the year 2003 on also phosphorus and nitrogen. The charges are calculated based on the rate of a "pollution unit" which can be illustrated at the following example: for 1997, 1 pollution unit was USD 7.5. For COD, 1 pollution unit is equivalent to the emission of 50 kg O2 and has to be paid if discharge concentration is higher than 20 mg/l and yearly emissions exceed 250 kg/year.
Hungary: 12) In addition to the described NCF on wastewater, there is also a NCF on sewerage which can be levied on non-household point sources which discharge wastewater into the sewage system. This NCF is calculated and imposed by the respective municipality while the revenue goes to the companies operating the sewage treatment plant. Data on total revenue are not available. Often, companies are charged which are in financial troubles and they do not pay. Charge levels are too low to give any real enforcement power. The relation between the wastewater NCF and the sewerage NCF is not coordinated enough.


REC * PROGRAMS * SOFIA INITIATIVES * ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS * REPORT ON THE USE OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS * ANNEX 3

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