C O O P E R A T I O N

Invitation to the negotiation table

Environmental organisations can influence multilateral banks' policies and decisions. But they must learn how to be taken seriously. Insight spoke to Petr Hlobil from CEE Bankwatch Network.


  The thin tail of hair sticking out the back of Petr Hlobil's smart shirt is a sign that he could be part of the civil society organisation (CSO) movement. But aside from that, the young coordinator of CEE Bankwatch Network could blend in easily with other delegates from international organisations, banks and the policymakers, who comprised the bulk of those assembling at the Aarhus conference in June. Although he stresses that campaigning against bank

  policy is not all about image, Hlobil believes that to achieve results CSOs must learn to work with those organisations which they protest against. That involves learning to negotiate effectively and understanding just how to influence funding or policy decisions from the inside. "I would not say that we are welcome at the table but we do have a dialogue with people at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank," Hlobil told Insight.

  Bankwatch, which is present in nine Central and Eastern European countries, is a critical environmentalist eye for projects funded by multilateral development banks, namely EBRD, the World Bank and European Investment Bank. As well as preparing studies on bank funding strategies the organisation trains CSOs to prepare themselves for meetings with bank decisionmakers and provides workshops on public participation and decisionmaking. According to Hlobil, environmental organisations often go wrong at their meetings with banks. "CSOs don't understand the structure of the bank, what exactly the target of their meeting is and what they can change by talking to the specific person they have arranged to meet with," he explains. Getting hold of the right person is a particular problem which CSOs can learn to overcome. Just having a contact at the World Bank is not necessarily an advantage, since the organisation has thousands of employees, working on separate, unrelated issues, points out Hlobil. "I would say that 80 percent of the time the problem is that they talk to the wrong person."

  As part of Bankwatch training to CSOs, the organisation took participants to an EBRD annual general meeting, where they had a chance to put the theory they had learnt in the classroom, into practice. "They could actually meet with bank staff and raise questions with them," he explains. Bankwatch will often sit into CSO-Bank meetings, to help assist an organisation achieve its expectations but after the training some groups feel ready to go it alone. CSOs in Russia and Georgia have successfully begun dialogues with banks as a result of bankwatch initiatives. Hlobil points out that following up the meeting is crucial for reaching long-term goals. In the end, the whole process, from planning the meeting through to contact with the person, correspondence through to confirming letter and further meetings, can take up to three months, he says. "We want to empower them to achieve what they want to achieve."

  To do that CSOs must understand how to work the law or international policy in their favour. It is up to environmental groups to learn what conventions and protocols such as those signed in Aarhus mean to their operation and to use that information in their arguments against funding institutions. As Swedish Environment Minister Anna Lindh warned "It's important to remember that the role of CSOs is not just to oppose." Growing up is the most painful phase of all.

Diplomatic campaining
Bankwatch's work with multilateral development banks (MDBs) yielded the following conclusions in its 1998 annual report:
  • The MDBs do not always follow up their mandate to support the building of democratic procedures in CEE countries. Very often project sponsors proceed through the public participation process on a formal, rather than substantive basis, following the letter, not the spirit of public participation procedures.
  • MDB investment supports an increase in greenhouse gas emissions. Of the USD 5.4 billion in MDB energy loans in the studied countries, more than USD 1.8 billion went towards coal fired plants, USD 1.0 billion went to oil and gas development, as well as support for fossil fuel energy production.
  • To date, the World Bank has not managed to transform its (1992) Energy Efficiency Policy into practice. Demand side energy efficiency is a very small portion of the WB energy investment portfolio. Most demand-side energy efficiency and renewable projects which WB is involved with are financed through GEF.
  • MDBs have not used many of the opportunities available to them for energy conservation in Eastern Europe. With the exception of EBRD's 1996 energy investments, all the banks continue their traditional lending patterns, which is supply- side and fossil fuel oriented.
  • There is not enough support for renewable resource energy projects from the MDBs. With the exception of hydro power MDBs rarely invest in renewable energy sources.
  • The EIB is the only MDB which does not have an energy policy.
  • There is a lack of MDB documents in the local languages of Central and Eastern Europe. Most MDB policy papers are published in English and a few in Russian.
  • The banks' policy papers cannot be transferred into lending portfolios until banks develop structures to apply progressive elements of their energy policies, such as supporting energy efficiency or the use of renewable energy resources. For example, although the EBRD had energy efficiency as a priority for development of the energy sector since 1992, its demand-side energy efficiency projects were only developed after 1995, when the bank set up its Energy Efficiency Unit.
  • Banks do not produce an inventory on greenhouse gas emissions data for their loans. Banks continue to invest primarily in fossil fuel projects and do not monitor climate impacts of the projects.
  • Projects are not generally evaluated for their energy efficiency potential.
  • Demand-side management and integrated resource planning are not considered binding principles for projects.
  • Energy sector development is not based on a sustainable development strategy for the whole economy but only on the expected growth of demand.


REC * EMTC * PUBLICATIONS * INSIGHT * SPRING/SUMMER 1998

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